Atlantic Council Global Foresight 2025: World War Risks, Nuclear Threats, and Geopolitical Trends

Global Foresight 2025 Survey Overview and Methodology

The Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security has published its fourth annual Global Foresight report, offering one of the most comprehensive snapshots of expert opinion on geopolitical trajectories through 2035. Conducted in late November and early December 2024 — crucially, after the US presidential elections — the survey captures the perspectives of 357 leading geostrategists and foresight practitioners drawn from the Atlantic Council’s extensive global networks.

The respondent pool spans over 60 countries across every inhabited continent, though approximately 55% hold US citizenship. The demographic skew leans male (74.5%) and older (39.5% aged 66 and above, 36.4% between 51 and 65). Professionally, the private sector accounts for 30.5% of respondents, followed by non-profit and think tank professionals (24.4%), academics (20.7%), independent consultants (16.3%), and government officials (14.8%). This blend of backgrounds ensures that the findings reflect diverse analytical frameworks and institutional perspectives.

Under the editorial guidance of Dr. Matthew Kroenig and the lead authorship of Dr. Peter Engelke, the report is structured around three components: ten major survey findings that distill the quantitative data, six “snow leopard” trends that highlight underappreciated developments, and three scenario narratives for the world in 2035. For professionals tracking global trade dynamics and security architecture, this report offers indispensable strategic intelligence.

World War Predictions: 40% of Experts Foresee Global Conflict

Perhaps the most alarming finding in the Global Foresight 2025 report is that 40.5% of respondents believe another world war — defined as a multifront conflict among great powers — will occur by 2035. This is the first year the Atlantic Council posed this question directly, and the response signals a fundamental shift in how security professionals assess the global threat landscape.

The implications are compounded by associated findings. Among those who predict world war, 63% also expect nuclear weapons to be used during the conflict, and 60% anticipate that military operations will extend into space. These are not marginal scenarios imagined by fringe commentators — they represent the assessed expectations of seasoned strategists with decades of policy experience.

The overall pessimism is striking: 62.2% of all respondents expect the world to be worse off in a decade, while only 37.8% hold an optimistic view. When asked about the single biggest threat to global prosperity, war between major powers (27.6%) ranks just behind climate change (29.9%), followed by declining trade and protectionism (13.5%). The convergence of military, environmental, and economic risks creates what researchers describe as a “polycrisis” environment where cascading failures become increasingly probable.

Expert commentator Markus Garlauskas frames the growing awareness as “actually a hopeful signal,” arguing that recognition of the risk could prompt the investments in deterrence necessary to prevent conflict. This perspective aligns with the classical strategic logic that credible deterrence depends on acknowledging the possibility of what one seeks to prevent.

Nuclear Proliferation Risks and Weapons Use Scenarios

The Global Foresight 2025 findings on nuclear risks are deeply concerning. A full 48% of experts now expect nuclear weapons to be used in the coming decade, a dramatic increase from 37% in the previous year’s survey. This trajectory, if it continues, suggests that the decades-long nuclear taboo may be weakening in the minds of those who study these issues most closely.

On the proliferation front, 88% of respondents expect at least one new country to obtain nuclear weapons by 2035. Iran leads the concern list at 72.8%, followed by Saudi Arabia (41.6%), South Korea (40.2% — a notable jump from 25% in 2024), Japan (28.6%, up from 19%), Ukraine (14.9%), and Taiwan (7.9%). The sharp increases for South Korea and Japan reflect growing anxiety about the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella in the Asia-Pacific region.

Regarding which actors might actually use nuclear weapons, Russia tops the list at 25.9% (nearly doubling from 14.1% in 2024), followed by North Korea at 24.2%, terrorist groups at 18.8%, and Israel at 12.3% (double the previous year). Dr. Matthew Kroenig’s commentary underscores that “nuclear weapons have returned to the center of geopolitics,” pointing to China’s rapid nuclear buildup and Russia’s regular nuclear threats as the key drivers. For those following international security trends, these proliferation dynamics carry profound implications for alliance structures, deterrence strategy, and arms control diplomacy.

China-Taiwan Tensions and Great Power Competition

The survey reveals a dramatic escalation in expert expectations regarding China-Taiwan tensions. Fully 65% of respondents now agree that China will attempt to retake Taiwan by force within the next decade, a fifteen-percentage-point increase from 50% in the 2024 survey. Only 24% disagree, down from 30%. Among those who also predict a world war, this figure surges to 79%.

The broader pattern of great-power bloc formation reinforces these concerns. Some 47.4% predict the world will divide into Chinese-aligned and US-aligned blocs by 2035, up from 44.4% the previous year. Among those who foresee bloc formation, approximately 60% expect the China-aligned bloc to include Russia, Iran, and North Korea as formal allies. The survey further finds that 45.9% of all respondents expect these four nations to forge a formal alliance, a significant jump from 33% who predicted merely a Russia-China alliance in 2024.

The correlation between bloc formation and conflict is telling: among respondents foreseeing both bloc division and a formal China-Russia-Iran-North Korea axis, 62% also anticipated world war, compared to just 33% among other respondents. Expert commentator Melanie Hart offers a more nuanced perspective, however, noting that China’s deep dependence on global economic integration limits the degree to which it can afford a formal military alliance. These nations are “partners with a shared interest” but “not true allies” — a distinction that may shape the pace and form of escalation.

The Future of US Power in a Multipolar World

The Global Foresight 2025 report charts a clear trajectory of declining confidence in American primacy. While 75.3% of respondents expect a multipolar world by 2035 — consistent with the previous year — the erosion of faith in US leadership is evident across every measured domain. Military dominance, historically the bedrock of US global influence, still commands the highest confidence at 71.3%, but even this has slipped from 81.1% in 2024.

Technological innovation leadership fell to 57.6% from 62.6%, economic primacy to 49.4% from 52.0%, and diplomatic dominance to a mere 23.6% from 31.7%. The new question on cultural and soft power drew only 35.4% confidence. Perhaps most troubling, 11.8% of respondents now expect the US to lead in none of these domains by 2035, up from 7.5%. This is a meaningful shift in a community of predominantly Western-oriented strategists.

The alliance dimension is equally significant. Only 60.9% expect the US to maintain its security alliances in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, a steep decline from 78.7%. The “don’t know” category more than doubled to 25.6%, reflecting genuine uncertainty about American commitment. Conversely, 48.4% now expect Europe to achieve “strategic autonomy,” up dramatically from 31.5%. The data suggests a world in which the post-war American-led order is not collapsing but gradually fragmenting, with partners hedging and adversaries sensing opportunity.

A critical correlation emerges: among respondents who expect no US dominance in any domain, 62% foresee a world war (compared to 38% among others), and only 24% believe the world will be better off. The message is clear — the decline of a stabilizing hegemon, in the eyes of these experts, increases the probability of systemic conflict.

Russia-Ukraine War Endgame and European Security

The survey presents a sobering outlook for Ukraine. Nearly half of respondents (46.6%) predict the war will end on terms largely favorable to Russia, while 43% foresee a frozen conflict. Only 4.2% expect an outcome favorable to Ukraine. This near-consensus that Russia will not lose — at least not in territorial terms — represents a significant strategic assessment from the Euro-Atlantic security community.

The escalation dynamic between Russia and NATO has also intensified in expert perception. Some 45% of respondents now agree that Russia and NATO will engage in direct military conflict by 2035, up sharply from 29% in 2024. Among those predicting a world war, 69% expect a Russia-NATO clash. This trajectory is shaped by Russia’s war in Ukraine, its nuclear signaling, and growing concerns about the vulnerability of NATO’s eastern flank.

Expert commentator John Herbst argues that the outcome depends most on US policy, outlining a possible Trump peace initiative: territorial concessions and no NATO membership for Ukraine (difficult for Zelenskyy), combined with a demilitarized zone with European troops and massive arming of Ukraine (difficult for Putin). The implication is that a negotiated settlement, while imperfect, may be the least dangerous path — though one that requires delicate calibration to avoid emboldening future aggression.

Democratic Recession and Institutional Decline

The global democratic outlook in 2025 is bleak. Nearly half of respondents (46.5%) expect what the report terms a “democratic depression” — a worsening of the democratic recession that has characterized the past two decades. Another 36.9% expect stasis, while only 16.6% foresee a democratic renaissance. Compounding this, 65% expect global press freedoms to decrease, with very few anticipating improvement.

Multilateral institutions fare poorly in expert assessment. The United Nations is expected to be less capable by 2035 by 75% of respondents (versus 9% who expect improvement). The WTO, G7, World Bank, and IMF all receive net-negative outlooks. Only three institutions buck the trend: BRICS (43% more capable versus 31% less), the EU (40% versus 33%), and ASEAN (40% versus 20%). Josh Lipsky’s commentary notes that Bretton Woods institutions remain functional because “they deliver real money every day,” while BRICS is “vastly overstated” in its potential — lacking a proactive agenda beyond opposing Western-led structures.

The implications for governance are profound. If the institutional architecture designed to manage interstate competition continues to erode, the mechanisms for conflict prevention, trade dispute resolution, and collective action on existential challenges like climate change become progressively weaker. For organizations tracking multilateral trade governance, these trends carry direct operational consequences.

Emerging Technologies and Snow Leopard Trends

Beyond the major survey findings, the report identifies six “snow leopard” trends — under-the-radar developments with outsized potential impact. These range from infrastructure vulnerabilities to breakthrough technologies that could reshape energy, climate, and security landscapes.

The terrorist threat to undersea cables stands out as particularly urgent. With 99% of international data and approximately $10 trillion in daily financial transfers passing through these cables, they represent a critical single point of failure for the global economy. The report documents that Houthi-affiliated channels have posted maps of undersea cable routes, and that non-state actors including groups in the Philippines and Egypt have previously attempted sabotage. The low-tech, high-impact nature of cable attacks makes them a persistent and growing concern.

On the technology front, enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) could power over 65 million US homes, yet the country has utilized less than 0.7% of its geothermal capacity. COF-999, a carbon-capture material developed by UC Berkeley researchers, can reach half capacity in just 18 minutes and remains reusable through more than 100 cycles. The carbon capture market is projected to reach $4 trillion by 2050, making these innovations potentially transformative for global energy transition efforts.

Quantum batteries represent another frontier, promising to store energy using quantum mechanics with higher energy density than lithium-ion alternatives. Potential applications include medical devices (relevant for the 26% of US adults with disabilities), electric vehicle charging measured in seconds rather than minutes, and hospital backup power systems. These technologies, while still early-stage, illustrate the breadth of innovation that could reshape geopolitical competition in the decades ahead.

Middle East Dynamics and Regional Transformation

The Global Foresight 2025 report reveals a Middle East locked in a complex web of conflict, normalization, and strategic recalibration. On the Israeli-Palestinian front, 62.5% of respondents predict the status quo — occupied Palestinian territories with no sovereign Palestinian state — will persist through 2035. Only 17.1% expect the emergence of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state coexisting with Israel.

Yet the region is far from static. Some 56% of experts expect Israel-Saudi diplomatic normalization, roughly consistent with previous surveys, suggesting that the Abraham Accords framework retains momentum despite the Gaza conflict. More dramatically, 36.4% expect Israel to have engaged in direct war with Iran, while only 9.4% foresee Israel-Iran diplomatic relations.

Expert commentator Alan Pino draws a critical lesson: October 7 demonstrated that status quo assumptions are inherently dangerous. “Clinging to an unstable status quo can be riskier than seeking to change it.” This insight applies beyond the Middle East — it captures a broader theme of the entire report, where the illusion of stability masks mounting structural pressures. On Iran’s nuclear trajectory, Pino notes the program is “far from inevitable,” with the outcome depending on policy choices by Iran, Israel, and the United States. The Arms Control Association continues to track these dynamics closely.

Implications for Global Policy and Strategic Planning

The Atlantic Council Global Foresight 2025 report carries several urgent implications for policymakers, corporate strategists, and institutional leaders. First, the rising probability of great-power conflict demands renewed investment in deterrence, defense readiness, and crisis communication channels. The 40% world-war prediction is not a forecast — it is a risk assessment that demands preparation.

Second, the nuclear proliferation and use data points underscore the need for reinvigorated arms control diplomacy. With 88% of experts expecting new nuclear states, the nonproliferation regime faces its greatest challenge since the Cold War. Strategic stability depends on engaging not only traditional nuclear powers but also threshold states like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.

Third, the erosion of confidence in US alliances signals that partners are actively hedging. Europe’s push for strategic autonomy, India’s non-alignment strategy, and growing uncertainty about US commitment all suggest a world in which regional security architectures will become more fragmented and self-reliant. Organizations should plan for scenarios in which traditional alliance guarantees carry less weight.

Fourth, the democratic recession findings highlight the importance of governance resilience. With nearly half of experts predicting worsening democratic conditions, investments in press freedom, institutional transparency, and civic engagement become strategic imperatives, not merely normative aspirations.

Finally, the snow leopard trends remind us that strategic surprise can come from unexpected directions. From undersea cable vulnerabilities to quantum batteries, the emerging technology landscape will create both opportunities and risks that defy conventional geopolitical categories. For those working at the intersection of policy and innovation, the lesson is clear: adaptability and foresight are the most valuable strategic assets. Explore more insights on emerging policy research through our policy analysis library.