Chatham House: Competing Visions of International Order in a Fracturing Multipolar World

Chatham House Research Overview and Context

Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, has produced one of the most comprehensive analyses of how the world’s most influential states perceive and respond to the shifting architecture of global power. Originally commissioned by the US National Intelligence Council, this research paper — edited by Leslie Vinjamuri and authored by 14 leading scholars — examines the competing visions of international order held by 12 carefully selected nations spanning Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Eurasia.

The selection is deliberate and strategic. The paper includes the great-power challengers (China, Russia), key adversaries (Iran), rising powers seeking greater autonomy (India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Turkey), traditional allies navigating new realities (Germany, France, Japan), and the United States itself as the architect of an order it is now dismantling. Each chapter was developed through individual author research and refined through a collective workshop at Chatham House, with updates following Trump’s November 2024 election victory and the initial months of his second term.

The analytical framework centers on a fundamental question: does each state seek to maintain, adapt, disrupt, or undermine the existing international order? The answers reveal a spectrum of positions far more nuanced than the simple “democracies versus autocracies” framing that dominates popular discourse. For professionals tracking global foresight and geopolitical risk, this research provides essential strategic intelligence on the forces reshaping international relations.

The Fracturing of the US-Led Liberal International Order

The paper’s opening chapter establishes the central thesis: the liberal international order, built on three pillars — democracy and rule of law, open trade, and institutionalized multilateralism — is facing its gravest challenge from the very power that created it. The United States, which accounts for 26% of global GDP, spends over $800 billion annually on defense, and maintains structural advantages in every major multilateral institution, is actively dismantling the system it forged from the ashes of World War II.

Trump’s second presidency has accelerated what was already a long-term trend. His threats to annex Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal have undermined global confidence in US commitment to sovereignty. The withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization, the freezing of foreign assistance, and the effective shuttering of USAID were early indicators. But the roots of US ambivalence predate Trump: the perception that military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq were costly “wars of choice,” combined with growing bipartisan anger over trade agreements like NAFTA, eroded the domestic consensus that sustained American internationalism for decades.

The paper argues that nationalism has proven “a more enduring, motivating and powerful force than globalism.” The US has substituted nationalism for globalism, unilateralism for multilateralism, and abandoned essential components of its soft power. For the rest of the world, this creates a fundamental strategic dilemma: the most powerful state in the international system is no longer a reliable guarantor of the order that others depend upon for stability and predictability.

China and Russia: Great Power Challengers

China’s chapter, authored by M. Taylor Fravel, reveals a sophisticated strategy of balancing against the United States while increasing global influence through parallel institutional structures. China views US-China rivalry as the defining geopolitical dynamic and has deepened partnerships with Russia, Iran, and other states through formats like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Its vision of international order emphasizes sovereignty over human rights, state-led development models, and a multipolar system where China holds co-equal status with the United States.

Russia’s approach, analyzed by Alexander Cooley, stakes global ambitions on regional dominance. Moscow’s vision is fundamentally revisionist: it seeks to overturn the post-Cold War settlement in Europe, establish recognized spheres of influence, and weaken the transatlantic partnership that anchors Western power. The war in Ukraine is the most visible expression of this strategy, but Russia also leverages energy dependencies, information warfare, and relationships with middle powers to extend its influence. The chapter notes that Russia’s partnership with China is primarily tactical — both share an interest in weakening US hegemony, but their long-term interests diverge significantly in Central Asia and beyond.

The critical insight from both chapters is that neither China nor Russia seeks to simply replicate the liberal international order with themselves at the helm. Instead, they envision a world of multiple poles with reduced American influence, where sovereignty trumps universal values, and where great powers maintain acknowledged spheres of influence. This vision has significant appeal to states that have historically been marginalized by Western-led institutions, which partly explains why multilateral trade governance is under increasing pressure.

Iran’s Resistance Worldview and Regional Ambitions

Sanam Vakil and Vali Nasr’s chapter on Iran reveals a worldview structured around the concept of “resistance” — a framework that has defined Iranian foreign policy since the 1979 revolution. Iran positions itself as a challenger to both the US-led order and regional status quo, leveraging proxy networks across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen to extend influence while maintaining plausible deniability. The chapter documents how Iran’s “axis of resistance” has served as a force multiplier, allowing Tehran to project power far beyond what its conventional military capabilities would suggest.

Iran’s vision of international order is fundamentally anti-hegemonic. Tehran opposes not just American dominance but the structural advantages embedded in institutions like the UN Security Council and the international financial system. The nuclear program serves multiple purposes: deterrence against regime change, prestige enhancement, and bargaining leverage. The chapter notes that Iran’s strategic calculations are shaped by the perception that the US and Israel represent existential threats, creating a security dilemma that drives both its nuclear ambitions and its support for non-state actors across the Middle East.

The implications for the broader international order are significant. Iran’s resistance model demonstrates that a middle power with limited economic resources can substantially disrupt regional security architectures through asymmetric strategies. As the Chatham House researchers note, this approach has been adopted, in various forms, by other states seeking to challenge established hierarchies without directly confronting superior military power.

India and Brazil: Non-Western Rising Powers

India’s chapter, authored by Chietigj Bajpaee, captures the essence of its strategic positioning in the title: “non-Western, not anti-Western.” India seeks a strong bilateral partnership with the United States while maintaining close ties to Russia and positioning itself as a leader of the Global South. This dual orientation reflects India’s determination to preserve strategic autonomy — the freedom to choose partners issue by issue rather than committing to any single bloc.

India’s vision is shaped by its colonial history, its democratic identity, and its aspiration to permanent UN Security Council membership. The chapter documents how India has leveraged its rising economic weight (now the world’s fifth-largest economy) to demand greater voice in international institutions while resisting pressure to take sides in US-China competition. India’s approach to the Ukraine conflict — maintaining relations with Russia while deepening defense cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia through the Quad — exemplifies this hedging strategy.

Brazil’s chapter, by Oliver Della Costa Stuenkel, reveals a similar commitment to strategic autonomy but with distinct Latin American characteristics. Brazil sees opportunity in multipolarity precisely because it reduces US dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Under both left and right governments, Brazil has pursued an independent foreign policy that prioritizes South-South cooperation, institutional reform, and resistance to external interference in domestic affairs. Brazil’s simultaneous membership in BRICS and its aspiration for a permanent Security Council seat illustrate the creative tensions within its international positioning.

Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Turkey: Managing Multipolarity

Three middle powers — Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Turkey — share a common strategic approach despite vastly different contexts: each seeks to manage multipolarity by diversifying partnerships and maximizing freedom of manoeuvre. Saudi Arabia, analyzed by Sanam Vakil, has transformed from a status quo power dependent on US security guarantees to an ambitious player actively hedging between Washington and Beijing. Vision 2030’s economic diversification agenda provides the domestic foundation for a more independent foreign policy, while the Abraham Accords framework and the potential for Israel-Saudi normalization open new diplomatic pathways.

Indonesia’s approach, examined by Ralf Emmers, is characterized by continuity and non-alignment. As the world’s fourth-most-populous nation and largest Muslim-majority democracy, Indonesia has pursued a “free and active” foreign policy since independence. The chapter documents how Jakarta has deepened engagement with both the US and China while resisting pressure to join any security alignment. Indonesia’s ASEAN-centered diplomacy reflects a preference for multilateral frameworks that amplify its voice without requiring strategic commitments.

Turkey’s chapter, by Senem Aydın-Düzgit and Ayşe Zarakol, reveals a more ambitious and assertive vision. Under Erdoğan, Turkey has pursued a foreign policy that leverages its geographic position between Europe and the Middle East, maintaining NATO membership while building relationships with Russia and exploring alternatives to Western institutional frameworks. Turkey’s vision is explicitly multipolar — it seeks a world where middle powers have greater influence and where the Western monopoly on norm-setting is broken. For analysts tracking how nations navigate the shifting landscape of international aid and policy, these hedging strategies are increasingly relevant.

European Responses: Germany and France in Crisis

The European chapters reveal allies in a state of strategic shock. Constanze Stelzenmüller’s analysis of Germany documents an “internationalist vision in crisis.” Germany’s post-war identity was built on multilateralism, institutional cooperation, economic interdependence, and deference to American security guarantees. Each of these pillars is now under stress: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exposed the failure of Wandel durch Handel (change through trade); China’s economic coercion challenges the export-driven model; and Trump’s second term has fundamentally shaken confidence in American commitment to European defense.

Germany’s response — the Zeitenwende (turning point) declared by Chancellor Scholz, the €100 billion special defense fund, and the painful reduction of energy dependence on Russia — represents the most significant reorientation of German strategic posture since reunification. Yet the chapter documents persistent tensions between Germany’s instinct for multilateral solutions and the new imperative for hard power investment, between its economic interests in China and its values alignment with the US, and between its European leadership ambitions and its domestic political fragmentation.

Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer and Martin Quencez’s chapter on France reveals a different European approach. France’s global status rests on averting bloc geopolitics — Paris seeks to maintain strategic independence through nuclear deterrence, permanent Security Council membership, and active engagement in Africa and the Indo-Pacific. France has been the most vocal European advocate for “strategic autonomy,” a concept that gained urgency as Trump’s second term unfolded. The chapter notes that France’s vision explicitly rejects a binary world of US-aligned and China-aligned blocs, instead advocating for European sovereignty that allows independent engagement with all major powers.

Japan’s Model for the Future Liberal Order

Jennifer Lind’s chapter on Japan offers perhaps the most surprising and thought-provoking vision. The paper asks: “Is Japan’s model the future of the liberal order?” Japan’s approach — maintaining stable relations with autocracies while prioritizing human security and rule of law over democracy promotion — represents a pragmatic liberalism that has largely avoided the backlash that has engulfed the US and Europe.

Japan’s approach is characterized by several distinctive features. It emphasizes infrastructure investment and public health over military intervention. It pursues economic engagement with authoritarian states while maintaining firm security alliances. Its immigration policy remains highly restrictive (2.2% foreign-born population, compared to much higher shares in Western democracies), insulating Japan from the anti-immigrant backlash that has fueled populist movements elsewhere. The Japanese foreign policy establishment has consistently prioritized quiet, constant engagement over high-profile confrontation.

The chapter argues that as liberal expansionism is curtailed by Chinese influence, rising middle-power assertiveness, and domestic backlash in Western democracies, Japan’s model offers a viable path forward. It is liberal in values but pragmatic in execution, principled but not preachy, and firmly committed to the national interest while contributing to global public goods. For a world in which the aggressive promotion of democracy has generated more resistance than conversion, Japan’s approach may prove to be the most sustainable version of the liberal order.

Envisioning the Future International Order

The concluding chapter synthesizes the competing visions into a sobering assessment of the future. The paper identifies several structural dynamics that will shape international order in the decades ahead. First, great powers — particularly China and Russia — will seek to establish recognized spheres of influence, but emerging powers will resist being forced into rigid blocs. The result is a world of “multiple alignments” rather than bipolar or tripolar structures.

Second, the demand for institutional reform is reaching a breaking point. If the UN Security Council remains unreformed, if IMF voting shares continue to underrepresent rising powers, and if the World Bank fails to adapt to new development realities, these institutions will progressively lose legitimacy. Brazil, India, and other emerging powers will channel their ambitions through alternative structures — BRICS, regional organizations, and bilateral arrangements — further fragmenting the institutional landscape.

Third, Europe’s push for strategic autonomy is real and accelerating. The Trump presidency has served as a catalyst for European defense investment, institutional deepening, and diplomatic independence that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. But Europe also faces internal challenges from far-right movements that explicitly reject liberal values, creating a two-front struggle: external competition from great-power rivals and internal erosion from illiberal populism. Explore our analysis of emerging policy frameworks shaping the new world order.

Implications for Global Governance and Strategic Planning

The Chatham House research carries several critical implications for policymakers, corporate strategists, and international organizations. First, the assumption that the liberal international order will self-correct is no longer tenable. The US withdrawal from its guarantor role is structural, not episodic — it reflects deep domestic political changes that will persist beyond any single presidency. Organizations should plan for a world in which American institutional commitment is conditional rather than automatic.

Second, the world of “multiple alignments” creates both opportunities and risks. States that can navigate between competing power centers — as India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are attempting — may extract significant concessions from all sides. But this also creates unpredictability that complicates long-term planning, alliance management, and institutional design. The old categories of “ally” and “adversary” are giving way to a more fluid spectrum of relationships defined by issue-specific alignment.

Third, institutional reform is no longer optional — it is existential for the multilateral system. The paper makes clear that emerging powers will not indefinitely accept governance structures that reflect the power distribution of 1945. Either the Security Council, IMF, and World Bank adapt, or they will be progressively bypassed by alternative institutions that better reflect contemporary realities.

Fourth, Japan’s pragmatic model deserves serious attention as a template for sustainable liberal internationalism. The aggressive promotion of democracy and human rights has generated backlash that now threatens the liberal order itself. A less ideological, more institutionally grounded approach — one that prioritizes human security, economic engagement, and rule of law over regime change — may prove more durable in a multipolar world. For those navigating these complex geopolitical dynamics, our policy analysis library offers complementary insights.