Global Foresight 2025: Strategic Trends Shaping a Dangerous Decade Ahead

The world stands at its most perilous inflection point since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Based on comprehensive analysis from 357 global strategists across 61 countries, the Atlantic Council’s latest Global Foresight survey paints an alarming picture: 62% of experts expect the world to be worse off in a decade, marking the highest recorded pessimism in the survey’s history.

Conducted in late November and early December 2024—following the US elections—this assessment reflects not momentary political anxiety but deep structural concerns about cascading global crises. The findings reveal expert consensus around multiple existential risks converging simultaneously: the highest probability of world war since 1945, accelerating nuclear proliferation, declining American hegemony, and the potential formalization of an authoritarian axis spanning China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

What makes these projections particularly sobering is their source: experienced practitioners from government, private sector, academia, and civil society who have witnessed previous cycles of global turbulence. Their systematic pessimism across conflict, institutional, and technological domains suggests we are entering what may prove to be the most dangerous decade in modern history.

A World on Edge — The Expert Consensus on 2035

The survey’s methodology provides confidence in its alarming conclusions. With 357 respondents from 61 countries—54.6% American citizens but including substantial representation from Europe, Asia, and other regions—the findings reflect genuine global expert opinion rather than parochial American concerns. The professional diversity is equally significant: 30.5% private sector, 24.4% nonprofit, 20.7% academic, 16.3% independent consultants, 14.8% government, and 3.6% multilateral organizations.

The demographic profile skews toward experienced practitioners: 75.9% are age 51 or older, with 39.5% age 66+. This is not millennial anxiety but the considered judgment of professionals who have navigated previous global crises and understand their historical context. The gender split (74.5% male, 25.2% female) reveals systematic differences in threat perception that prove significant across multiple survey domains.

Perhaps most striking is the consistency of pessimism across different professional backgrounds and geographic regions. Unlike previous years where optimism and pessimism roughly balanced, the 2025 survey shows unprecedented consensus around negative trajectories. This convergence suggests that expert assessment has moved beyond ideological or methodological differences toward recognition of genuinely deteriorating global conditions.

The shift from balanced optimism-pessimism in previous years to 62% pessimism represents more than statistical variation—it reflects expert recognition that multiple crisis dynamics are reinforcing rather than offsetting each other.

The Shadow of World War — Great-Power Conflict Risks at Historic Highs

40.5% of experts expect a world war—defined as multifront conflict among great powers—by 2035. This figure, unprecedented in modern polling, reflects the convergence of multiple flashpoints that could trigger broader conflicts: Taiwan, Ukraine, the Middle East, and potentially space-based military confrontations.

The Taiwan scenario has escalated dramatically in expert assessment. 65% now expect China to attempt retaking Taiwan by force, a substantial increase from 50% in the 2024 survey. This shift reflects multiple factors: increased Chinese military capability, declining confidence in US deterrence, and growing Chinese impatience with the status quo. Military experts note that China’s rapid naval expansion and missile deployment in Fujian Province suggest preparation for conflict rather than mere posturing.

Russia-NATO direct conflict expectations have similarly spiked to 45%, up from 29% in 2024. The ongoing attrition in Ukraine, combined with NATO weapons being used against Russian territory, has created escalation pathways that many experts view as increasingly likely to be triggered by miscalculation or desperation. As one European respondent noted, “We are one major incident away from Article 5 activation.”

A new dimension emerges in space warfare expectations, with 45% anticipating military conflict in space by 2035. This reflects both technological development—multiple nations now possess anti-satellite capabilities—and the strategic importance of space-based assets for modern military operations. The vulnerability of satellite constellations that enable GPS, communications, and intelligence creates incentives for preemptive strikes in any major conflict.

Nuclear Dangers — Proliferation and the Unthinkable Use of Weapons

Perhaps no finding is more alarming than the dramatic increase in expectations of nuclear weapons use. 48% of experts now anticipate nuclear weapons being used by 2035, representing an 11-percentage-point jump from 37% in 2024. This shift reflects both increased proliferation risks and growing instability in regions with nuclear capabilities.

Russia emerges as the most likely user at 25.9%, followed closely by North Korea at 24.2%. The Russian figure has nearly doubled from 14.1% in 2024, reflecting concerns about Putin’s willingness to escalate as conventional military options prove inadequate in Ukraine. North Korea’s nuclear threats against South Korea and the United States have similarly intensified, with experts viewing Kim Jong Un’s regime as increasingly willing to use nuclear weapons if faced with existential threats.

Proliferation expectations have also accelerated across multiple countries. Iran remains the most likely new nuclear power at 72.8%, but significant increases appear in Asian allies: South Korea jumps from 25% to 40.2%, while Japan rises from 19% to 28.6%. These shifts reflect diminishing confidence in US extended deterrence and growing regional arms race dynamics.

Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program expectations at 41.6% create particularly concerning implications for Middle East stability. A nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia would likely trigger additional proliferation across the region, potentially including Turkey and Egypt. The Kingdom’s investments in uranium enrichment and reactor technology suggest movement beyond peaceful nuclear energy toward weapons capability.

Ukraine’s appearance as a potential nuclear power at 14.9% represents a new development reflecting its wartime circumstances and substantial nuclear expertise from the Soviet era. While Ukraine surrendered nuclear weapons in 1994 under the Budapest Memorandum, ongoing Russian aggression has led some Ukrainian officials to publicly discuss nuclear options if Western support proves insufficient.

The Emerging Axis — China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea

46% of experts expect China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to formalize their partnership into a military alliance by 2035. This potential axis formation represents perhaps the gravest long-term strategic challenge to Western interests since the Cold War, combining the world’s second-largest economy with substantial military capabilities across multiple domains.

The statistical correlation proves striking: among experts who expect this axis to formalize, 62% predict world war versus only 33% among those skeptical of alliance formation. This suggests that axis consolidation and global conflict risks are interconnected rather than separate phenomena—formal alliance structures may increase rather than decrease conflict probability by creating rigid commitments and tripwire mechanisms.

Current partnerships already demonstrate concerning coordination levels. Russia receives North Korean artillery shells and Iranian drones for use in Ukraine, while China provides Russia with dual-use technology and economic support to circumvent Western sanctions. North Korea’s nuclear program benefits from Russian and potentially Chinese technical assistance, while Iran’s missile technology appears in Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping.

The distinction between partnership and alliance may seem academic, but formal mutual defense commitments would fundamentally alter global strategic calculations by creating automatic escalation mechanisms across multiple theaters.

However, significant constraints limit axis formation. China’s economic interests remain deeply integrated with Western markets, creating costs that formal alliance with sanctioned states would exacerbate. Geographic distance limits practical military coordination, while ideological differences—particularly between China’s technocratic authoritarianism and Iran’s theocratic system—create persistent friction points.

The 47.4% expectation of a world divided into China- and US-aligned blocs suggests that even without formal alliance, effective bloc competition may emerge through economic and technological interdependencies. Countries increasingly face pressure to choose technological ecosystems, supply chains, and security partnerships that align with one superpower or the other.

American Power in Decline — The Erosion of US Dominance

American global dominance faces unprecedented erosion across every measured dimension. Most dramatically, confidence in US alliance maintenance has collapsed from 78.7% to 60.9%—a stunning 17.8 percentage-point drop reflecting both Trump administration policies and broader questions about American reliability and staying power.

Military dominance, while still substantial at 71.3%, has declined nearly 10 points from 81.1% in 2024. This remains America’s strongest suit, but the trajectory suggests growing expert skepticism about maintaining military superiority against Chinese and Russian modernization efforts. The US defense industrial base struggles with capacity constraints while competitors increase production rates and field new capabilities.

Diplomatic power has eroded most severely, dropping from an already-low 31.7% to just 23.6%. This reflects multiple factors: reduced diplomatic personnel and resources, inconsistent policy approaches across administrations, and declining soft power following domestic political polarization and international military interventions. One Asian diplomat noted that “America still has the biggest stick, but fewer countries want to be seen carrying it.”

Economic power expectations have modestly declined from 52.0% to 49.4%, but this masks significant structural changes. While the US economy remains large and dynamic, China’s manufacturing base, technological capabilities, and financial resources have narrowed traditional American advantages. The dollar’s reserve currency status faces gradual erosion through Central Bank Digital Currency development and bilateral trade arrangements bypassing dollar systems.

European strategic autonomy expectations have surged from 31.5% to 48.4%, representing the most dramatic shift in alliance dynamics. This reflects European frustration with American unilateralism, concerns about US commitment to NATO, and growing confidence in European military capabilities. The war in Ukraine has paradoxically both strengthened transatlantic ties through shared threat perception while accelerating European defense independence through increased military spending and capability development.

Technological innovation leadership, once an unquestioned American strength, has declined from 62.6% to 57.6%. China’s rapid advancement in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and renewable energy has narrowed gaps that seemed insurmountable just a decade ago. American innovation advantages increasingly concentrate in specific sectors rather than broad technological leadership.

Ukraine, Gaza, and the Middle East — Conflicts Without Clear Resolution

The Ukraine conflict outlook reflects grim expert assessment of Western staying power versus Russian determination. 46.6% expect the war to end on terms largely favorable to Russia, with an additional 43% anticipating a frozen conflict that preserves Russian territorial gains. Only 4.2% foresee outcomes favorable to Ukraine—a devastating assessment of Western strategy and Ukrainian prospects.

These projections reflect multiple factors: Russian mobilization capacity, Western political divisions over continued aid, and Ukrainian manpower constraints after nearly three years of high-intensity warfare. European experts note privately that current aid levels may be unsustainable politically and economically, while Russian economic resilience has exceeded Western expectations despite comprehensive sanctions.

Middle East dynamics show similarly pessimistic trajectories. 62.5% expect the status quo of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories to persist through 2035, suggesting that the October 7 attacks and subsequent Gaza war have not created conditions for sustainable resolution. Only 17.1% anticipate Palestinian statehood alongside Israel, indicating expert skepticism about two-state solution viability.

Israeli-Saudi normalization remains possible at 56%, demonstrating that broader regional realignment may proceed despite Palestinian-Israeli intractability. However, 36.4% expect direct Israeli-Iranian war, reflecting the proxy conflicts and escalatory dynamics that threaten to engulf the region. Iran’s nuclear program advancement creates timeline pressure that may trigger preemptive action regardless of diplomatic preferences.

The correlation between these conflicts and broader global instability appears significant. Experts who anticipate favorable Russian outcomes in Ukraine are more likely to expect Chinese military action against Taiwan, suggesting that successful aggression in one theater may encourage it in others. Similarly, those expecting Israeli-Iranian direct conflict show higher expectations of broader Middle East instability affecting global energy markets and alliance relationships.

The Institutional Deficit — Multilateralism Under Siege

Global governance institutions face unprecedented legitimacy crises reflected in expert expectations of declining capability. 75% expect the United Nations to be less capable by 2035, while 67% anticipate reduced UN Security Council effectiveness. These figures represent comprehensive expert rejection of current multilateral frameworks’ ability to address emerging challenges.

The World Trade Organization faces the steepest decline expectations, with 59.8% anticipating reduced capability versus only 8.9% expecting improvement. This reflects both American and Chinese willingness to use unilateral trade measures, the failure to reform dispute resolution mechanisms, and the rise of bilateral and regional trade arrangements that bypass multilateral frameworks.

Bretton Woods institutions—the IMF and World Bank—show mixed but concerning trajectories. While retaining more expert confidence than political institutions, approximately 41-46% expect declining capability. This reflects both governance challenges as emerging economies demand greater voice and representation, and resource constraints as development financing needs exceed available multilateral resources.

Regional and alternative institutions show more promise. BRICS capabilities are expected to increase by 43.5% of experts, while ASEAN receives positive assessments from 37.4%. The European Union, despite internal challenges, earns optimistic ratings from 39.5% of respondents, rising to 50% among EU citizens themselves—suggesting that closer integration efforts may prove more successful than global multilateral frameworks.

The pattern suggests a broader shift from universal multilateralism toward regional and ideological blocs. Institutions that require consensus among competing powers face decline, while those operating among more aligned members show resilience or growth. This fragmentation may provide effective governance for member states while reducing global coordination capability.

Democracy in Retreat — From Recession to Depression

46.5% of experts anticipate a “democratic depression” by 2035—a worsening from current democratic recession levels toward more comprehensive institutional breakdown. Only 16.6% expect democratic renaissance, while 36.9% foresee continued stasis. This represents expert consensus that democratic systems face sustained rather than cyclical challenges.

Press freedom expectations compound these concerns, with 65.2% anticipating decreased media independence (49.7% somewhat, 15.5% greatly). Only 9.6% expect press freedom improvements, suggesting that information environments supporting democratic discourse will continue deteriorating through technological manipulation, legal restrictions, and economic pressure on independent media.

Rights curtailment risks fall disproportionately on marginalized communities. LGBTQI+ identifying groups face the highest risk at 24.6%, followed by women at 19.8%, religious minorities at 13.6%, and marginalized racial groups at 13.3%. These patterns suggest that democratic erosion operates through targeted rather than universal oppression, making resistance more difficult by dividing potential opposition.

The correlation between democratic pessimism and conflict expectations proves significant. Experts anticipating democratic depression are more likely to foresee nuclear weapons use, world war, and authoritarian alliance formation. This suggests that domestic institutional breakdown and international instability may be mutually reinforcing rather than separate phenomena.

However, 12.4% of experts believe none of these groups face elevated rights risks, and significant minorities expect institutional resilience. Democratic institutions have survived previous crises through adaptation and reform, suggesting that current challenges, while severe, may not prove insurmountable with appropriate responses.

The Gender Divide — Women’s Bleaker View of the Global Future

One of the survey’s most striking findings involves systematic gender differences in threat assessment across multiple domains. Female respondents consistently show higher pessimism than male counterparts, with gaps often exceeding 15 percentage points on critical security questions.

61% of women expect nuclear weapons use versus 44% of men—a 17-point gap that suggests fundamentally different risk perceptions. Similarly, 54% of women anticipate democratic depression compared to 44% of men, while 32% of women identify women as the group most at risk of rights curtailment versus only 16% of men.

American power assessments show parallel patterns: 58% of women expect continued US military dominance versus 76% of men, while technological innovation leadership expectations split 47% versus 61%. These gaps persist across professional backgrounds and age categories, suggesting systematic rather than demographic differences in global outlook.

Several explanations may account for these patterns. Women may have greater awareness of rights vulnerabilities based on historical and contemporary experience of discrimination. Professional underrepresentation in foreign policy and security fields may also contribute to different information sources and analytical frameworks. Economic research shows women face disproportionate impacts from crises, potentially creating more acute awareness of systemic risks.

The gender divide in global threat assessment may reflect women’s greater awareness of vulnerability to conflict, rights erosion, and institutional breakdown based on historical patterns of how crises affect different populations unequally.

These findings have practical implications for risk assessment and policy development. If female experts’ pessimism proves more accurate than male assessments, current security planning may systematically underestimate threats and vulnerabilities. Conversely, if male assessments prove more realistic, resource allocation toward crisis preparation may be excessive relative to actual risks.

Technology’s Dual Edge — AI Optimism Amid Social Media Alarm

Technology assessments reveal nuanced expert opinion that distinguishes between different technological impacts. Artificial intelligence optimism has increased to 57.6% (up from 51% in 2024), while biotechnology maintains the highest positive ratings at 80.9%. Quantum computing (76.2%) and robotics/drones (59.8%) also receive broadly positive assessments.

In sharp contrast, social media platforms face overwhelming negative expectations at 74.3%, with only 22.3% anticipating positive impacts. This dramatic disparity reflects expert recognition that social media’s role in spreading disinformation, polarizing societies, and undermining democratic discourse outweighs its communication and mobilization benefits.

AI optimism may reflect growing familiarity with practical applications in healthcare, scientific research, and productivity enhancement, while concerns about displacement and autonomy have moderated as deployment experiences accumulate. The technology’s integration into existing workflows appears less disruptive than initially feared, though longer-term effects remain uncertain.

Energy infrastructure implications of AI development create new challenges as computational demands for large language models and data centers strain electrical grids. Some estimates suggest AI could consume 3-4% of global electricity by 2030, requiring massive renewable energy deployment to avoid exacerbating climate change while supporting technological advancement.

Space technology benefits from growing commercial investment and demonstrated military applications, while biotechnology advances in precision medicine, agricultural productivity, and materials science receive widespread expert recognition. The pattern suggests technologies with clear beneficial applications and limited negative externalities earn positive assessments, while those with significant social disruption potential face skepticism regardless of technical capabilities.

Six Snow Leopards — Under-the-Radar Threats and Opportunities

Beyond headline trends, six “snow leopard” phenomena—rare but potentially decisive developments operating below mainstream attention—could create strategic surprises for organizations that fail to monitor weak signals effectively.

Undersea Cable Terrorism: The Internet’s Achilles Heel

Houthi threats against undersea cables connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa through the Red Sea represent a new category of asymmetric warfare. With over 95% of intercontinental data traffic traveling through subsea cables, successful attacks could isolate entire regions from global communications. The low cost and high impact of cable terrorism make it attractive to non-state actors seeking maximum disruption with minimal resources.

Enhanced Geothermal Systems: The Clean Energy Breakthrough

Enhanced geothermal systems (EGS) technology has advanced sufficiently to potentially power 65 million US homes using enhanced drilling techniques to access heat sources previously inaccessible. Unlike solar and wind power, geothermal provides constant baseload power without storage requirements, potentially solving renewable energy’s intermittency challenges while requiring minimal land use.

COF-999: Direct Air Capture Game-Changer

University of California Berkeley researchers developed COF-999, a yellow powder that can capture carbon dioxide directly from ambient air with unprecedented efficiency. Large-scale deployment could remove significant atmospheric CO2 at costs potentially competitive with emissions reduction, offering hope for addressing legacy carbon while transition to clean energy proceeds.

Rewilding at Scale: The Billion-Acre Opportunity

Approximately 1 billion acres of degraded agricultural land worldwide could be returned to natural ecosystems without threatening food security through improved farming efficiency and dietary changes. Large-scale rewilding could simultaneously address biodiversity loss, carbon sequestration, and climate resilience while creating new economic opportunities in ecotourism and ecosystem services.

Quantum Batteries: The Storage Revolution

Quantum battery research has achieved breakthroughs in energy storage density and charging speed that could revolutionize medical devices, electric vehicles, and grid storage. Unlike conventional batteries that degrade through chemical reactions, quantum batteries could provide longer lifespans and instant charging capabilities that remove current electric vehicle adoption barriers.

Gen Z Misinformation Vulnerability: The Information Paradox

Despite being digital natives, Generation Z shows surprising vulnerability to misinformation through social media platforms, often displaying less ability to identify false information than older generations. This paradox may reflect overconfidence in digital literacy combined with algorithm-driven information environments that prioritize engagement over accuracy.

Three Worlds in 2035 — Scenario Planning for the Decade Ahead

Expert assessments suggest three plausible scenarios for global development by 2035, each reflecting different combinations of current trends and policy responses. Understanding these scenarios enables strategic planning across multiple possible futures rather than single-point predictions.

Scenario 1: The Reluctant International Order

In this scenario, the rules-based international order muddles through current crises without fundamental transformation. A bioweapon scare—perhaps involving modified pathogens or laboratory accidents—catalyzes renewed international cooperation similar to nuclear arms control after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Trade evolves into regional blocs but maintains some global connectivity. Major powers avoid direct war through careful crisis management, but no democratic renaissance emerges.

Key characteristics include: continued US military dominance but reduced diplomatic influence; European strategic autonomy achieved pragmatically without abandoning NATO; China’s rise plateaus due to demographic and economic constraints; nuclear proliferation continues but without weapons use; climate cooperation expands through necessity despite political divisions.

Scenario 2: China Ascendant

American domestic divisions lead to sustained isolationist policies, creating space for Chinese global leadership. China subordinates Taiwan through comprehensive blockade rather than invasion, avoiding direct US military confrontation while achieving strategic objectives. Economic gravity shifts decisively toward Beijing as developing nations join Chinese-led institutions and trade arrangements.

Democratic norms erode globally as authoritarian models demonstrate apparent effectiveness. US allies hedge increasingly toward China while maintaining nominal Western alignment. Russia achieves favorable Ukraine settlement that legitimizes territorial conquest. Nuclear proliferation accelerates as extended deterrence loses credibility.

Scenario 3: Climate of Fear

Climate tipping points approach faster than expected, creating 150 million climate migrants by 2035 and triggering border militarization across developed nations. South Asia approaches knife’s edge through water scarcity and extreme heat. Geoengineering deployment begins without international coordination, creating new conflicts over planetary management.

Paradoxically, climate crisis enables populist movements to embrace environmental action as nationalist imperatives. Border walls proliferate while internal climate resilience programs expand. International cooperation occurs around climate adaptation rather than traditional security issues. Democratic systems prove more adaptable to emergency governance than authoritarian systems prove to climate stress.